Benefit–Cost Analysis of Social Media Facilitated Bystander Programs by Ebers, Axel & Thomsen, Stephan L.
J. Benefit Cost Anal. 2021; 12(2):367–393
doi:10.1017/bca.2020.34
© Society for Benefit-Cost Analysis, 2021. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which
permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is
properly cited.
Axel Ebers and Stephan L. Thomsen*
Benefit–Cost Analysis of Social Media
Facilitated Bystander Programs1
Abstract: Bystander programs contribute to crime prevention by motivating people
to intervene in violent situations. Social media allow addressing very specific target
groups, and provide valuable information for program evaluation. This paper pro-
vides a conceptual framework for conducting benefit–cost analysis of bystander
programs and puts a particular focus on the use of social media for program dissem-
ination and data collection. The benefit–cost model treats publicly funded programs
as investment projects and calculates the benefit–cost ratio. Program benefit arises
from the damages avoided by preventing violent crime. We provide systematic
instructions for estimating this benefit. The explained estimation techniques draw
on social media data, machine-learning technology, randomized controlled trials and
discrete choice experiments. In addition, we introduce a complementary approach
with benefits calculated from the public attention generated by the program. To
estimate the value of public attention, the approach uses the bid landscaping method,
which originates from display advertising. The presented approaches offer the tools
to implement a benefit–costs analysis in practice. The growing importance of social
media for the dissemination of policy programs requires new evaluationmethods. By
providing two such methods, this paper contributes to evidence-based decision-
making in a growing policy area.
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1. Introduction
Every economist would clearly agree that violence causes immense social damage,
but agreement on how society can avoid the damage is less clear. Incarceration
appears to be less efficient than prevention (Welsh et al., 2015). However, what type
of prevention promises the largest benefit to society? Evidence casts doubt on the
prevention program addressing the potential offender or victim (DeGue et al., 2014).
The program addressing the potential bystander appears more promising. The
bystander program aims to contribute to crime prevention by motivating people to
intervene when they observe warning signs or incidents of violence. During the
program, people train the skills necessary for safe and effective intervention. To
the extent that training is successful, the program reduces violent crime. Related
evidence supports this hypothesis. For example, universities with a bystander pro-
gram in place experienced a significant reduction in the crime rate (Coker et al.,
2015). These universities found a way to avoid the social damages from violence.
Despite its success in preventing crime, the bystander program can be a challenge
for the budget and the potential participant. The traditional bystander program consists
of face-to-face training in small groups. Training a large number of people requires a
large number of staff. High staff requirements make the program costly. Attending the
program can also be a challenge as training takes place at a scheduled date and place.
Someone who has another date or lives far from the training place cannot attend.
These challenges sparked the development of bystander programs that provide
the training via the internet. The online bystander program requires less staff to train a
large number of people. Low staff requirements make the program cost efficient
(Cugelman et al., 2011). People can attend the training on their computer at a flexible
date and place. Higher flexibility will increase the number of attendants (White et al.,
2010). Early studies found that online bystander programs have the same positive
effects as traditional programs. The most discussed examples of online bystander
programs are TakeCare (Kleinsasser et al., 2015) and RealConsent (Salazar et al.,
2014). Both programs aimed to address the challenges described above and were
successful in promoting bystander behavior.
The online bystander program in turn may not find enough suitable participants.
Social media may help with that problem. Firms increasingly rely on social media to
reach customers with their ads. Facebook dominates the digital advertising market
(eMarketer, 2019). OnFacebook, millions of people post, like, and share information
about their personal life. Facebook uses this information to understand their most
private traits including personality, political views, or sexual orientation (Kosinski
et al., 2013). The traits of a person have a strong influence on her future behavior. Just
as firms pay Facebook to find the people who are most likely to buy their products,
government agencies use the platform to find the people who are most likely to
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benefit from their program interventions. For the case at hand, these are the people
who are the most likely to become a bystander of a violent situation.
Besides targeting and large-scale dissemination of content, social media allow
conducting social experiments. For example, Bond et al. (2012) conducted a ran-
domized experiment to show that Facebook ads affect voter turnout. Similar exper-
iments would allow to show the effect of a bystander program. The estimated effect
can form the basis for a benefit–cost analysis. Benefit–cost analysis is the most
important instrument for assessing the efficiency of prevention measures. However,
despite the possibilities of program dissemination and data collection, no study to
date has analyzed the potential of social media for the implementation and benefit–
cost analysis of bystander programs.
We aim to fill this gap by providing a conceptual framework for conducting
benefit–costs analysis of bystander programs, and put a special emphasis on the
potential of social media in this context. The conceptual framework consists of an
extended benefit–cost model, and a set of research approaches to estimating the
program benefit. Within this framework, benefit arises from the damages avoided by
preventing violent crime. Because the practical implementation demands a lot of time
and resources, the concept is better suited for large-scale bystander programs. For
small-scale programs, we suggest a complementary approach, where benefit arises
from the value of public attention generated by the program.
Our conceptual framework requires that the bystander program and the benefit–
cost analysis be implemented simultaneously. Our work is therefore of interest to
both the practitioner who is commissioned to implement a bystander program, and
the researcher who has to conduct the benefit–cost analysis of that program. Fur-
thermore, benefit–cost analysis should ultimately serve the policy maker who has to
decide on program funding. Our work will help her to understand and classify
information coming from a benefit–cost analysis.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out the theoretical
foundations of our conceptual framework including the mechanics of bystander
programs, and the potential outcomes of a violent situation. In Section 3, we develop
our extended benefit–cost model, which employs the benefit–cost ratio as the model
framework. The value of benefits depends on the number of crimes prevented, and
the average damage coming from one of these crimes. Section 4 provides systematic
instructions for each step to estimating the number of crimes prevented. First, it
explains how to use social media and web analytics tools to estimate the number of
program participants. Second, it introduces a machine-learning approach for esti-
mating the share of future bystanders among participants. Third, it explains how to
conduct a randomized experiment on Facebook to estimate the program effect on
bystander behavior. Fourth, it provides an estimator for the number of bystanders that
are injured during their intervention. Section 5 describes how to use discrete choice
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experiments to estimate the average damage from violent crime. Section 6 introduces
our complementary approach that uses the bid landscaping method to estimate the
value of the public attention generated. The last section provides some conclusions.
2. Theoretical considerations
2.1 Bystander programs and the prevention of violence
Imagine you observe a man about to slap a woman in the face. Bystander behavior
includes different reactions to observing physical violence. Positive reactions include
the four Ds: direct, distract, delegate, and delay. Direct tactics involve direct inter-
vention aiming to prevent or stop the violence. Youmay try to come between the two
or even hold the man down. Direct tactics are quite risky. Distraction tactics distract
the attention of the offender to rescue the victim. You can try to engage the man in a
conversation and bring the woman away. Delegation tactics involve other people and
a plan for cooperation. You may talk to the man, while another person brings the
woman away. Delay tactics apply after the violent situation. Youmay give first aid or
consolation. You may also help the woman to find a good hospital or counseling
center. (Banyard et al., 2005). The appropriate tactic depends on the situation at hand.
For example, you should save direct tactics for dangerous emergencies.2
Bystander behavior cannot be taken for granted though. Before you intervene,
you have to overcome a series ofmental obstacles (Latané&Darley, 1970). You have
to notice the event in the first place. Assuming you do, you have to understand that the
event marks a case of violence, feel responsible for helping, and know you have the
skills for intervention. Finally, you have to think that helping is better than not. Only
if you overcome all the mental obstacles, you will take action. Different factors
decide if you manage to overcome a particular obstacle. Interdependencies and
feedback loops connect the different obstacles with each other. Figure 1 illustrates
the mental process for better memorization.
When you make a decision, you will not weigh the pros and cons of helping in a
purely rational way. The burden to decide comes suddenly and unexpected. Options
for influencing the situation are limited. Fear and anxiety hold you back, while anger
and indignation push you forward (Halmburger et al., 2017). You do not know all the
potential outcomes of helping. Even less do you have measurable criteria to calculate
expected utility (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002; Simon, 1959). According to the concept
2 An alternative framework differentiates between reactive and proactive bystander opportunities as well
primary (before the assault), secondary (during the assault), and tertiary (after the assault) prevention in
the context of sexual violence (McMahon & Banyard, 2012).
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of bounded rationality, each human decision results from this interplay of several
factors: the time available, the tractability of the situation, and the cognitive resources
of the decision-maker.
Given the limited time and resources, you takemental shortcuts to find a practical
solution. The final solution may not be optimal, but satisfactory (Simon, 1955).3 The
mental shortcuts rely on cues such as emotions, well-known examples, or the
behavior of others (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). If other bystanders are present
during the attack, you may think that they should help. If they do not, you may think
that they disapprove helping. Remarkably, the other bystandersmight think the same.
Both thoughtsmay stop all of you from intervening (Darley&Latané, 1968; Latané&
Darley, 1969). In very dangerous emergencies, however, the described bystander
effect is less pronounced (Fischer et al., 2011).4
The typical bystander program tackles the mental obstacles to bystander behav-
ior (Kettrey &Marx, 2020). The trainer will explain that you might fail to notice the
event if you are in a hurry or look at your smartphone all the time. She will also
describe the warning signs of violence. Knowing the warning signs allows you to
assess any situation correctly. Since the trainer must motivate you to act despite
personal risk, she will emphasize personal responsibility and the potentially severe
health consequences of physical violence. You will get to reflect your own knowl-
edge and attitudes. In role-plays, you will practice the skills for safe and effective
intervention. The practice will help you to internalize the skills and strengthen your
confidence. The acquired knowledge and hands-on practice will help you overcom-
ing the obstacles to intervention (Jonas et al., 2007).
Notice The Event
Interpret The Event as
Violence
Feel Responsible






Figure 1 The mental obstacles to bystander behavior.
Notes: The model illustrates the mental obstacles to bystander behavior.
Source: Own representation based on Latané and Darley (1970).
3 The described concept of satisficing also applies to moral behavior (Gigerenzer, 2010).
4 The described factors leading to the bystander effect are called diffusion of responsibility and pluralistic
ignorance.
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The typical online bystander program will provide the same theoretical knowl-
edge and practice, but rely on different communication channels. Instead of a human
trainer, you may receive the information via image, text, or video content. A chat bot
or forum allow interaction by posting and discussing questions. Instead of role-plays,
you may practice your intervention skills in videogames. Despite the differences in
communication channels, the online program will still aim to tackle the mental
obstacles to bystander behavior. If you apply the practiced skills to a violent situation,
it will likely have a good outcome.
2.2 The potential outcomes of a violent situation
Building our benefit–cost model requires analyzing the potential outcomes of a
violent situation. For the analysis, we differentiate between four scenarios. In the
first scenario, the bystander fails the mental obstacles described in Figure 1, and does
not intervene. Remember that violence causes immense social damage. The victim
suffers the pain, cannot go to work, and has to pay the physician. The state has to pay
the investigator, prosecutor, and prison guard. The offender may suffer the conse-
quences of incarceration. But since the offender lacks standing, we do not count his
costs in our benefit–cost analysis (Zerbe & Bellas, 2006). The working hours missed
by the victim reduce the total economic production. Public spending on the justice
system strains the public budget. The reduced production and additional public
spending represent immense social damage (Becker, 1968).5
In the second scenario, the bystander overcomes the obstacles and attempts to
intervene. During the attempt, the offender injures the bystander instead of the initial
victim. Now the bystander suffers the described consequences of violence. The
public still has to carry the spending on the justice system. The overall social damage
remains the same.
In the third scenario, the bystander is able to help the victim without suffering an
injury herself. Successful bystander behavior prevents the social damage of violence.
The victim can carry on working and spending her money on food and clothes. The
state can build more schools, roads, or fiber optic cables. The benefit of bystander
behavior comes from the additional productivity, consumption spending, and infra-
structure investment. Each time a participant of the bystander program prevents a
violent crime, we can assign the social benefit to the program (Welsh & Farrington,
2000).
5 We refer the interested reader to the standard literature on the Costs of Crime (e.g. Cohen, 2000, 2005;
Cohen & Bowles, 2010).
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In the fourth scenario, the bystander misunderstands the situation. Because of
high arousal and strong emotions, she intervenes without danger ahead. Unjustified
interventionmight spark costly conflicts. Furthermore, the bystandermight injure the
person she falsely regards as the offender. Since the “false offender” has done nothing
wrong, we would have to count his damages. The fourth scenario is unlikely though.
Our model only considers the behavior of people who completed the training. We
assume that well-trained people will not misunderstand the situation. Based on the
assumption, we exclude the fourth scenario from the following consideration.
3. Building the benefit–cost model
We build our model within the framework of the benefit–cost-ratio (BCR). As we
have described above, the benefit arises from preventing violent crime and the
resulting social damage. The costs include all expenses on implementing the




Policy makers can use the benefit–cost-ratio for their funding decisions. Suppose
they consider funding a single program. If the benefit–cost-ratio is above one, the
program benefits society and should obtain funding. If the benefit–cost-ratio is below
one, the program costs society and should obtain no funding.
The benefit–cost-ratio has the advantage that it allows comparing programs,
even if they come from different policy areas. In case the policy maker has to choose
between several programs, she should choose the program with the highest benefit–
cost-ratio. We build our model on the assumption that the benefits and costs of the
bystander program accrue in the short term. Because of the short-term view, we
refrain from discounting the benefits and costs.
3.1 Estimating program costs
Remember that program costs include the expenses for implementing the program.
We can simply read the expenses from the account statement. The bulk of expenses
will arise from social network advertising. We must rely on ads for reaching enough
people tomake an impact on society. Here, we face the problem that organic reach on
social media is low. On Facebook, for example, organic reach ranges between 2%
and 6%. This means if we have 100 followers and refrain from advertising, only 2 to
6 persons will have our content displayed in their feed (Mochon et al., 2017).
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The second largest bulk of expenses arises from labor. We need staff to develop
the strategy, set up the online presence, and create appealing content. We also need
staff to manage and analyze our media, community, and promotions. Operating costs
include license fees for software and design elements. Pro rata costs include real
estate, public utilities, maintenance of equipment, office supplies, insurance pre-
miums, depreciation and replacement, and taxes (Milbrath, 2016).
3.2 Estimating program benefits
While we can find the costs on our account statement, we must put more effort into
finding the benefits of the bystander program. Suppose benefit arises from crime
prevention as described above. In order to estimate the monetary value of the benefit,
we must answer two fundamental questions: First, how many crimes are prevented
because of the bystander program? Second, what is average monetary damage
coming from one of these crimes? If we multiply the number of crimes prevented
by the damage per crime, we get the monetary value of program benefits.
In turn, the number of crimes prevented is the product of several factors. The
program will only reach a certain number of participants. Only some of the
participants will encounter a violent situation and get the chance to intervene.
Of those who get the chance, only some will actually intervene and prevent a
violent crime. Remember that some bystanders replace the initial victim. In case
the bystander is injured instead of the initial victim, the total number of crimes
remains unchanged.
If we multiply the total participants by the share of participants who become a
bystander of a violent situation, the share of bystanders who intervene in that
situation, and the rate of non-replacement, we get the number of crimes prevented.
If we thenmultiply the number of crimes prevented by the average damage per crime,
we get the monetary value of benefits:
BENEFIT ¼PARTICIPANTSBYSTANDER INTERVENTION
 1REPLACEð ÞDAMAGE (2)
Where PARTICIPANTS is the total number of program participants, BYSTANDER is
the share of participants who become a Bystander, INTERVENTION is share of
bystanders that intervene because of the program, and REPLACE is the share of
bystanders who are injured during intervention. Logically, 1REPLACEð Þ is the
share of safe interventions. DAMAGE represents the average monetary damage per
crime. In order to calculate the value of program benefits, we must separately
estimate each factor in equation (2), and then multiply the factors as described above.
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4. How many crimes are prevented?
4.1 Estimating the number of program participants
The number of program participants has a direct influence on the number of crimes
prevented. The more people participate, the more people will be motivated and able
to intervene when they observe a risky situation. The appropriate technique for
estimating the number of participants depends on distribution channel. If the program
distributes its content directly to the social media feed, the corresponding social
media analytics tools will display the relevant outcome metrics including reach and
videos. While the reach metric gives us the number of people who had the oppor-
tunity to see a post, the videos metric counts how many people watched a video for
three seconds or longer. Depending on the form of content, the corresponding metric
will provide a good estimate of the number of participants.
Direct distribution to the social media feed may be suited for a brief program
intervention, which consists of a series of posts or videos. A program that is more
complex may redirect the participant from the social networking site to an external
website, which contains the program content. A website specially built for the
purpose offers a higher degree of design freedom. For example, it allows using
interactive content like videogames. Now the estimation of the number of partic-
ipants requires installingGoogle Analytics and setting up the website in a particular
way. Each time a person completes the bystander program, the website must
display a specified page. We must define the page as a destination goal in Google
Analytics. Now Google Analytics will count the number of times that a person
completed the program. Online marketers call a completed activity a conversion. In
our context, the reach, videos, or conversions provide good estimates of the number
of participants.
Even though the presented estimation techniques rely on the best technology
available to date, interpretation of the metrics must take place with some caution.
Instead of perfectly accurate information, the analytics tools provide estimates with
an underlying probability distribution. Imperfection arises from technical problems
including cookie deletion,multiple-machine browsing, or non-human traffic (Sterne,
2010). To account for the imperfection, sensitivity analyses is mandatory when
estimating the number of program participants. Sensitivity analysis involves assum-
ing a margin of error for the outcomemetrics, and calculating confidence intervals on
that basis. Theminimum, average, andmaximum values from the confidence interval
enter equation (2) to examine how variation in the outcomemetric affects the program
benefits.
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The estimated number of participants forms the upper bound for the number of
crimes prevented. In order to provide conservative estimates, we assume that partic-
ipants will intervene not more than once, and exclude possible spillover effects on
their family and friends from further examination.
4.2 Estimating the share of participants that become a
bystander
For effective crime prevention, a large number of program participants is necessary
but not sufficient. Only the persons that become a bystander of a violent situation get
the chance to prevent a crime. A higher share of such persons among program
participants will ceteris-paribus increase the number of crimes prevented. Every
participant that does not become a bystander costs the programwithout returning any
benefit. The program should therefore aim to target future bystanders. Estimating the
share of future bystanders relies on the following expression:
BYSTANDER¼ Risk population
1PRECISION 1Risk populationð Þ , (3)
where Risk population is the share of the total population that is at risk of becoming a
bystander.PRECISIONWe suggest using the rate of violent crime to approximate the
share of the total population at risk. A higher general crime rate increases the
likelihood of becoming a bystander. Police statistics and victimization surveys
provide information on the crime rate. The PRECISION coefficient measures the
precision in targeting the persons at risk. Appendix A shows the derivation of
equation (3).
According to equation (3), the share of the population at risk forms the lower bound
for the share of future bystanders among program participants. If targeting is completely
imprecise PRECISION ¼ 0ð Þ, the share of future bystanders among participants is
equal to the share of the population at risk BYSTANDER¼Risk populationð Þ. In
contrast, if targeting is completely precise PRECISION ¼ 1ð Þ, every program partici-
pant will become a bystander in the future BYSTANDER¼ 1ð Þ.
In order to target specific consumers for their advertising costumers, Facebook
andGoogle rely on machine learning technology. Researchers increasingly discover
the potential of the technology for prevention policy. In a feasibility study, Hassan-
pour et al. (2019) use Instagram data and machine learning to identify persons at risk
of substance abuse. Since we also use social media to target program participants, we
suggest applying their approach to identify persons at risk of becoming a bystander.
Although the approach uses Instagram data, the procedure should also be suited for
other social networking sites.
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The approach bases on the assumption that Instagram profile data contain
information, which indicates risk. People share information about their personal life
by posting image and text content. Lifestyle choices and social environments influ-
ence the level of risk (Calvó-Armengol &Zenou, 2004;Walters, 2017). For example,
a lot of violence happens in nightlife. People who routinely engage in nightlife are
more likely to encounter a violent situation. Many party pictures in the profile may
therefore indicate risk.
Researchers can train a machine-learning architecture to extract the information
from Instagram profile data that indicates risk, and classify people into risk catego-
ries accordingly. Then, they can test if the trained model makes correct predictions
about the risk categories. Finally, they can use the extracted information to target the
suitable program participants. The test results allow estimating the share of future
bystanders among participants. For training the machine-learning architecture, one
must first draw a random sample of persons who have an Instagram profile. The
application-programing interface allows downloading the profile data, which con-
sist of pictures, captions, and comments on pictures made by other people. To predict
the risk category of a person based on her profile data, the algorithms need informa-
tion about the true risk level. To gather the information, we use an online survey that
asks the person about experiences with violence (Mynard & Joseph, 2000). More
experiences with violence indicate a higher risk level. Wematch the survey data with
the profile data using a unique identifier, in order to prepare the next step.
The machine-learning architecture consists of several layers of neural networks.
The first layers extract the relevant information from the profile data, while the last
layer generates the risk estimation model. Because images and text have different
data structures, different neural networks are required to extract information from
each data type. Roughly speaking, the neural networks take the relevant information
from the image or text, and map it to a vector space. For example, each word in the
English language has an index number based on its position in the dictionary. The
first word in the dictionary has number 1, the second number 2, and so on. The neural
networkmaps words to a vector space based on their co-occurrences in the Instagram
captions or comments. The vector space enters the risk estimation model in the next
layer.
The risk estimation model is based on a neural network layer with softmax
normalization and a cross-entropy loss function. The softmax function takes the
vector space of real numbers generated in the previous layer, and normalizes it to a
probability distribution. After applying softmax, each component of the vector space
can be interpreted as a probability. Larger input components will lead to larger
probabilities. The probability distribution is the predicted value of risk. The cross-
entropy loss function provides a measure of dissimilarity between the predicted risk
and the true risk. Rememberwemeasured the true risk using the online-survey.When
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true risk and predicted risk are the same, the loss function takes on the minimum
value. At this point, the model makes a correct prediction of risk categories.
The risk estimation model is trained using a particular subsample – the training
set.Training involves finding the vector weights that minimize the cross-entropy loss
function. For this purpose, the authors suggest to use stochastic gradient descent,
which is an iterative algorithm to find the minimum value. Imagine the loss function
as range of mountains: From a starting point, the algorithm goes along the descent
until the numerical value does not improve any more. The model may then be trained
in several iterations. After each iteration, one should feed back the cross-entropy loss
to the neural network in order to improve the predictions as explained above.
Another subsample – the test set – is used to evaluate if the trained model makes
correct predictions about the risk categories.Precision is a standardmachine learning
evaluation metric that measures the share of correct predictions. We can formally






The numerator is the number of persons who truly belong to a particular risk category
according to their survey data. The denominator is the number of persons classified as
belonging to this risk category by the trained model.
Persons in the high-risk category are likely to become future bystanders. With
our bystander program, we should therefore target persons with similar Instagram
profiles and sociodemographic characteristics. Instagram allows targeting such per-
sons based on their location, sociodemographic characteristics, interests, and online
behavior. We only have to enter the respective information into the advertising
platform. If we use the presented approach for targeting, we can enter the
PRECISION metric into equation (3) to estimate the share of future bystanders
among participants.
Potential shortcomings of the machine learning approach arise from training the
models on an imbalanced distribution of risk-classes among people. In the population,
we observe a low prevalence of high-risk individuals. A random sample, therefore, is
probably skewed towards the lower risk population. The imbalance can negatively
affect the performance of the models, which rely on information of each risk group.
Nevertheless, we can overcome this shortcoming by oversampling high-risk individ-
uals. For example, the study may include a high proportion of juvenile offenders.
Further shortcomings relate to potential biases and privacy issues. To address these
issues, we must implement legal regulations and boundaries before real-life imple-
mentation. Finally, implementing the approach would require a lot of time and
resources. The research team that wants to implement the approach requires at least
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one machine-learning expert, but these experts are scarce. We therefore suggest con-
ducting a pilot study to extract the relevant information from social media data. Ideally,
this information will be made available to other researchers who want to conduct a
benefit-cost analysis of a social media facilitated bystander program or a similar policy
measure.
Our approach may remind the informed reader of predictive policing. The two
approaches are similar, yet distinct. While predictive policing includes methods to
predict likely offenders or victims (Perry, 2013), our approach aims to predict likely
bystanders of a violent crime. Remember that prevention programs that address
potential offenders or victims are less effective than programs that address potential
bystanders. Furthermore, arresting a potential offender based on a prediction is
incompatible with the principles of the rule of law. Our approach therefore presents
a useful extension of the idea of predictive policing.
4.3 Estimating program effectiveness
Program effectiveness is crucial for the number of crimes prevented. A bystander
program is only effective if it changes the behavior of its participants. But only some
of the participants who encounter a violent situation will intervene because they have
finished the program. Other participants will not intervene at all, while yet others
would have intervened in any way. Only for the first group, we can say the program
had a causal effect. In other words, the causal effect is the change in behavior we can
clearly attribute to the program. The more people intervene because they have
finished the program, the larger is the causal effect (Thomsen, 2016).
Actual bystander behavior, however, is hard to observe under experimental con-
ditions. We therefore suggest measuring the causal effect on the willingness to inter-
vene (WTI). The willingness to intervene is an example of behavioral intention, which
is the single best predictor of actual behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011). In order to
measure thewillingness to intervene,we suggest using the scale developed byBanyard
et al. (2005). The scale asks respondents to express the likelihood that they would
perform each of 51 bystander behaviors. Possible answers range from 1 (very unlikely)
to 7 (very likely). An exemplary item reads as follows: “How likely are you to
investigate if you are awakened at night by someone calling for help?” (Banyard
et al., 2007, p. 8). Themean score over the 51 items gives a measure of the willingness
to intervene.6
6 Few studies have attempted to observe bystander behavior under experimental conditions. For one of
these studies, researchers staged a violent situation, and assessed whether participants actually tried to help
the false victim. They also measured the time it took them to decide before helping (Fischer et al., 2006).
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In order to estimate the causal effect, we suggest conducting a randomized
experiment, which involves randomly assigning participants to either the treatment
group (TG) or the control group (CG), and measuring the difference in outcomes
between the two groups. The treatment group receives the bystander program, while
the control group does not. The suggested experimental design uses timing as the
randomization method.
We explain the basic procedure of conducting the randomized experiment on
Instagram. Nevertheless, researchers can apply the procedure to other social net-
working sites as well. The experiment requires setting up an Instagram page and at
least two ad campaigns. Remember that advertising is necessary to reach a sufficient
sample size. With both ad campaigns, we target persons who are likely to become a
bystander. These are personswho have the same characteristics as the high-risk group
identified by the machine-learning approach. For targeting these persons, we have to
enter their location, sociodemographic characteristics, and interests into Instagram’s
advertising platform.
As explained above, we achieve randomization by the timing of the ad cam-
paigns. The ads of the first campaign take place before the start of the bystander
program. The ads contain a link redirecting people to an online-survey that measures
their willingness to intervene. Since they have no access to the bystander program,
the respondents of the first survey form the control group.
The ads of the second campaign take place after the start of the bystander
program. They contain a link that redirects people to the website holding the program
content. At the end of the program, another link redirects people to the online-survey
measuring the willingness to intervene. Since they received the bystander program,
the respondents of the second survey form the treatment group. To ensure that the
second ad campaign does not reach anymembers of the control group, wemust set an
exclusion parameter in the advertising platform of Instagram.
Random assignment prevents people from choosing one of the two groups based
on their personal characteristics. So-called self-selection would yield biased esti-
mates. If, for example, all people who already have a high willingness to intervene
would choose the treatment group, while all people with a lowwillingness choose the
control group, the mean difference between the groups would overestimate the effect
of the bystander program. In this context, we speak of selection bias. But if random
assignment works and the sample is large enough, the two groups are similar in all
observable and unobservable characteristics. Now the difference in outcomes does
not result from difference in individual characteristics but only from program
Such experiments are, however, subject to serious ethical concerns, and hard to implement within the
online environment.
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participation. Under randomization, the mean difference in outcomes thus yields a
consistent estimate of the causal effect:
INTERVENTION ¼WTITGWTICG: (5)
WTITG is the mean willingness to intervene in the treatment group, andWTICG is the
mean willingness to intervene in the control group. To be very specific,
INTERVENTION shows the average causal effect of the program on its participants,
the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). For the case at hand, the ATT
measures the share of bystanders that intervene because they have finished the
program.7
Although social sciences widely accept randomized experiments as the gold
standard of policy evaluation, the method has particular limitations. The randomized
experiment is the best method for estimating the treatment effect only if randomiza-
tion does not affect the decision to participate in the program. We speak of random-
ization bias. Furthermore, for a multistage program, the mean-difference estimator is
only valid conditionally on the stage where randomization takes place (Heckman,
2020). Since we assume a one-stage program where randomization does not affect
the decision to participate, the limitations do not apply.
Another limitation arises from the fact that people tend to express strong behav-
ioral intentions but fail to act accordingly. The gap between intention and actual
behavior results from differences between perceiving hypothetical situations and
perceiving real situations. Because of this so-called hypothetical bias, the answers
given in a survey might overstate the true underlying willingness to intervene (Ajzen
et al., 2004).We can draw on two potential solutions to the problem. The first solution
involves explaining hypothetical bias before asking the questions on the willingness
to intervene. The second involves asking respondents how certain they are about the
answers they have just given (Blumenschein et al., 2008).
4.4 Estimating the rate of replacement
The last factor considered in this section is the rate of replacement, which we have
denoted as REPLACE. As described above, the rate of replacement measures the
share of bystanders who are injured during their attempt to intervene. If the
bystander replaces the initial victim, the total number of crimes remains unchanged.
In reverse, 1REPLACEð Þ measures the share of interventions without
7 In order to see if randomization was successful, it is mandatory to be checking for balance. This means
that we test the hypothesis, that the distribution of covariates is similar in both of the groups (TG and CG).
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replacement. The extent to which replacement occurs is an open question we have
to answer empirically.
For our conceptual framework, we assume that the rate of replacement consists
of an idiosyncratic component and a systematic component. The idiosyncratic
component depends on the capacity of the bystander to intervene safely. The capacity
in turn depends on the skills acquired during the bystander program. If the bystander
program has been able to increase the capacity by teaching the necessary skills, the
rate of replacement will decrease accordingly.
To estimate the effect of the bystander program on skills, we include the
bystander efficacy scale in the experiment described in the previous section. For
each of the 51 presented bystander behaviors, the scale asks respondents for their self-
confidence in performing the behavior. Possible answers range from 0% (“cannot
do”) to 100% (“very certain can do”) in 10% increments. The mean value over the
51 items yields the bystander efficacy score (Banyard et al., 2005).
Themean difference in the bystander efficacy score between the treatment group
and the control group provide a consistent estimate of the program’s causal effect on
the intervention skills:
SKILLS¼EFFICACYTGEFFICACYCG: (6)
EFFICACYTG is the mean bystander efficacy score in the treatment group, and
EFFICACYCG is the mean bystander efficacy score in the control group. The
SKILLS term is the ATT on the capacity for safe intervention.
The systematic component of the risk of replacement includes all factors that are
beyond the control of the bystander. The systematic risk factors include the charac-
teristics of the victim, offender, and situation. Systematic risk increases the risk of
replacement. To capture systematic risk, we add a risk premium to our consideration,
which is denoted as RISK . We can express the rate of replacement as a function of
skills and the systematic risk premium:







The first partial derivative shows that a higher level of skills decreases the rate of
replacement. The second partial derivate shows that systematic risk increases the rate
of replacement. If we assume a linear relation between the rate of replacement, skills,
and systematic risk, we can use the following expression:
REPLACE¼ 1SKILLSþRISK: (9)
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On that basis, we can calculate the rate of replacement as follows:
1REPLACEð Þ¼ 1 1SKILLSþRISKð Þ (10)
⇔ 1REPLACEð Þ¼ SKILLSRISK (11)
In turn, we can insert the rate of replacement into equation (2) in order to calculate the
benefits of the bystander program.
Potential limitations of the approach arise from the assumption of linearity and the
proper estimation of the risk premium. To account for the limitations, we recommend
conducting sensitivity analysis by systematically varying the risk premium in equation
(11) in order to see how variation affects the program benefits given by equation (2).
We may also consider different functional forms for equation (7).
5. What is the damage per crime?
To calculate the value of program benefits, we have to multiply the number of crimes
prevented by the average damage per crime. We denote the average damage as
DAMAGE. To obtain an estimate for the average damage, we have to make four
preliminary considerations. First, we have to decide on the scope of analysis. The
scope of analysis determines the perspective fromwhichwe consider the benefits and
costs of the program. Ultimately, we aim to serve the policy maker who decides on
the funding of the program. The policy maker should consider the effect of the
program on overall welfare. We therefore consider the damages incurred by the
taxpayer and the victim.
Second, we have to decide if we consider social costs or external costs. Social
costs reduce the aggregate well-being of society, while external costs refer to neg-
ative consequences imposed by one person to another – who does not voluntarily
accept the negative consequences. Because we lack a general agreement on which
approach to prefer, we suggest providing estimates based on both approaches. On
that basis, the policy maker can choose the approach she prefers.
Third, we must decide if our estimates should base on incidence or prevalence.
Incidence-based estimates count the present and future costs in the year in which the
crime takes place. Prevalence-based estimates count the costs in the year in which
they are realized, regardless of when the crime has taken place. Because incidence-
based estimates show how much we could save by preventing future incidents, they
are better suited for our framework.
Fourth, we must choose the appropriate costing methodology. For our concep-
tual framework, we suggest the use of discrete choice experiments (DCEs). Appendix
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B provides an overview of alternative costing methodologies including the jury
awards method, the life satisfaction method, and the quality-adjusted life years
method.
Discrete choice experiments are a top-down, stated preferences approach to
estimating the damages of crime. Top-down approaches attempt to combine all cost
components into a single measure by estimating the public willingness-to-pay for
crime reduction. Stated preferences methods use surveys to ask respondents for their
subjective willingness-to-pay. Picasso & Grand (2019) use discrete choice experi-
ments to estimate the willingness-to-pay for a reduction in homicide risk. Picasso &
Cohen (2019) extend the approach by including the risk of violent crime. Based on
their examples, we explain the basic procedure for estimating the damages of crime.
The procedure consists of three general steps. In the first step, we use discrete choice
experiments to measure the individual preferences for crime prevention. In the
second step, we estimate the discrete choice model, which consists of several utility
functions representing the preferences. Based on the estimated utility functions, we
calculate the average value of damages in the third step.
As described above, we use discrete choice experiments to measure the prefer-
ences for crime prevention. Each experiment consists of several choice tasks. Each
task involves the choice between three alternatives: the status quo and two security
programs. We describe the security programs with the associated crime risk, policy,
and program costs. We illustrate the crime risk using the number of victims among
family and friends during one year. The policies differ in the intensity of police
presence and the strictness of sentencing. Finally, we exemplify the costs using a
hypothetical tax for implementing the security program. Crime risk, policy, and
program costs of the security programs are expressed in relation to the status quo.8
The status quo and the alternative scenarios are fundamentally different. The
status quo is well known, while the alternative scenarios are hypothetical. To con-
sider the difference, we present each choice task in two stages. First, the respondent
has to choose whether to stay in the status quo or to invest in a security program.
Second, she has to choose between the two security programs. If we assume ratio-
nality, people will select the alternative that generates the highest utility. The choices
made thus reflect their individual preferences.9
The discrete choice model represents the decision-making patterns during the
choice experiments as a set of utility functions:
8 We can implement the choice experiments using oTree, which is a software platform for economics
experiments.
9 To reduce the number of possible choice tasks, an optimal experimental plan can be followed.
Accordingly, a reduced number of tasks is created using Fedorov's (2013) algorithm. These tasks are
arranged into blocks that are manageable for respondents via the algorithm by R. K. Meyer & Nachtsheim
(1995). Finally, the different blocks are randomly assigned to the survey participants.
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eUait ¼Uaitþ εait: (12)
The term eUait is the unobservable true utility generated by alternative a for individual
i in task t. Utility depends on the deterministic component Uait , and the random
component εait . The random component accounts for issues such as omitted vari-
ables, measurement errors, or individual deviations from rationality. With no loss of
generality, we can express the deterministic component as a function that is linear in
parameters:
Uait ¼ β0xait: (13)
β is a vector of coefficients associated with the vector x of the explanatory variables.
The explanatory variables are the attributes of the alternatives. They include the crime
riskV (% of households victimized/year), the strictness of sentencing S (0 for current,
1 for strict), police presence P (0 for current, 1 for extended), and the costs of the
security program C (monetary units/month). Note that S, P, and C take on a value of
zero for the status quo. The β coefficients capture the sensitivity of the utility to
changes in the explanatory variables.10
Model calibration consists of finding the values of the β coefficients that best
reproduce the choices peoplemade during the choice experiments. To account for the
two-stage structure of the choice tasks, we employ a nested logit discrete choice
model. This means we estimate amultinomial logit model at each stage of the choice
task. We conduct the calibration of the model via maximum likelihood estimation
using any common statistical packages, e.g. like R or STATA. In order to explore the
functional form, we estimate different model specifications.11 We can compare the
different model specifications using Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC) and
likelihood-ratio (LR).12
Finally, we use the estimated utility function to calculate the average damage per
crime. We can derive the average damage from the marginal rate of substitution
(MRS) of money for risk:
10 Choices are likely to differ between individuals. To account for individual differences, the set of
explanatory variables can be expanded to demographic and psychographic measures z, with the associated
vector of coefficients γ. The individual differences may be hypothesized to influence utility via the vector
of β coefficients.
11 For example, Picasso & Cohen (2019) perform quadratic Box & Cox (1964) estimation. This implies
including level, square and cross terms for each of the explanatory variables.
12 AIC provides a means for model selection. Suppose a statistical model aims to represent a data-
generating process. The representation will never be exact. Some information will be lost instead. AIC
estimates the relative amount of lost information. When comparing several models, researchers should
choose the one with the lowest AIC score. In comparison, when conducting a LR test, they should choose
the model with the highest log-likelihood.
Benefit–cost analysis of social media 385
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/bca.2020.34







The numerator is the marginal utility of crime risk, and the denominator is the
marginal utility of program costs. Put simply, the marginal rate of substitution
(approximately) indicates how many monetary units a household is willing to give
up in exchange for a reduction in crime risk. The marginal rate of substitution thus
captures the averagewillingness to pay for crime reduction per household.Multiplied
by the number of households in the population, the marginal rate of substitution
yields a good estimate ofDAMAGE. In order to calculate the benefit of our bystander
program, we insert the estimate of DAMAGE into equation (2).
As a potential limitation, the DCE method is only valid to the extent to which
surveys are able to elicit the true preferences. In response, revealed preferences
methods could be considered as reasonable alternatives. This is because they elicit
preferences from actual market transactions.13 Revealed preferences methods are,
however, only valid if we can assume market efficiency and full information on risks
and prices. They are also limited to actually observed crime rates and spending
patterns. This makes it impossible to value hypothetical risks or policies yet to be
implemented.
Furthermore, different crimes are highly collinear. For this reason, revealed
preferences cannot isolate the value of specific crimes. They also tend to underesti-
mate the true costs of crime. Finally, the required market data are not always
available. This is especially true in developing countries. Because of the stated
reasons, revealed preferences methods are difficult to implement in practice. This
makes stated preference approaches the usual choice (Cohen & Bowles, 2010;
Picasso & Cohen, 2019; Picasso & Grand, 2019).
6. Estimating the value of public attention
In the previous three sections, we have described our conceptual framework for
estimating the benefits of a social media facilitated bystander program. Within the
framework, program benefit arises from crime prevention. In this section, we
13 For example, Thaler (1978) derived property owners’WTP for a safe neighborhood from differences
in property values. This approach is based on the assumption that neighborhoods with higher crime rates
ceteris paribus have lower housing prices (see also Hellman & Naroff, 1979; Rizzo, 1979). A similar
revealed preferences approach derives the value of a statistical life from compensating wage differentials
for on-the-job exposure to the risk of death (Viscusi & Aldy, 2003). This approach evaluates wage-risk
tradeoffs in labor markets assuming that workers are willing to accept a marginally higher fatality risk in
exchange for appropriate compensation.
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introduce a complementary approach where benefit arises from the public attention
on the issue of violence. The basic rationale behind the complementary approach is as
follows: in the information age, attention has a value of its own. In order to determine
the value of attention, we suggest using an opportunity cost approach, which draws
on methodology from online display advertising.
With the proliferation of digital media, information is abundant, almost free of
charge, and available in real time. Because of non-rivalry and non-excludability in
consumption, some economists even consider information a public good. Under
these circumstances, attention is the limiting factor in the consumption of information
and thus considered a scarce resource (Davenport & Beck, 2001). Because we trade
consumer attention on the digital advertising market, the market price will reflect the
value of attention.We use themarket price to estimate the opportunity costs of paying
attention to a particular piece of information – the bystander program.
The most common form of trading online ad space is programmatic advertising
with real-time bidding (RTB). Programmatic advertising accounted for 73% of the
U.S. digital advertising market in 2017. In 2023, the market share is expected to be
92% (Statista, 2018).Real-time bidding is a complex process, which involves several
parties that interact automatically in real time. In essence, each time a person visits a
website, the system auctions the available ad space on an ad exchange. See Appendix
C for a detailed description of the real-time bidding process.
Under real-time bidding, the hammer price depends on both the characteristics of
the website and the person paying attention to it. We can exploit the fact that the
market price partly depends on personal characteristics, to estimate the value of
attention of a specific group of people – the participants of the bystander program.
For estimating the value, we employ the bid simulator in Google Analytics. The bid
simulator simulates a process called bid landscaping. In bid landscaping, advertisers
place bids on several websites, in order to see how varying the bid price influences the
probability of winning the bid. Cost curves illustrate the relation between the bid
price and the probability of winning the bid as depicted by Figure 2 (Paulson et al.,
2018).
The bid price is expressed in cost per mille (CPM), which is the price of
generating a thousand impressions, i.e. a thousand opportunities to see the
ad. The probability of winning the bid increases with the bid price. The cost curve
is concave meaning the bid price has decreasing marginal effects on the probability
of winning.
Notably, the bid simulator allows simulating cost curves for specific target
groups based on their demographic, psychographic, and behavioral data. As implied
above, we can exploit this feature to estimate the value of attention generated by the
bystander program. For estimating the value of attention generated, we collect
demographic (and psychographic) information from a representative sample of
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program participants.We enter the collected information in the bid simulator, which
generates cost curves based on the information. For different bid prices, the gener-
ated cost curve will show the probability of winning the bid for people who have the
same characteristics as our program participants. The bid prices thus reflect the value
of having their attention with a certain probability.
The described approach uses the bid price as an estimate of the value of attention
per capita.We multiply the bid price by the total number of program participants to
calculate the total value of attention generated by the program. For the bystander
program to be profitable, the value of attention generated should exceed the expenses
for program implementation. Again, we suggest conducting sensitivity analysis. For
this purpose, we calculate the bid prices that have 0.5 and 0.95 probability of winning
the bid respectively. The bid price with a 0.5 probability of winning is the average
CPM. We can use the average CPM for calculating the lower bound of program
benefits. The bid price with a 0.95 probability of winning provides the basis for
calculating the upper bound.
Of notice, the approach described above represents a useful extension to the
more comprehensive conceptual framework developed in the previous sections.
Figure 2 Example cost curve.
Notes: The cost curve illustrates the mathematical relation between the bid price and the probability of
winning the bid. This relation is revealed through the process of bid landscaping. The bid price is expressed
in cost per mille. This is the price of generating thousand impressions. The probability of winning the bid
increases with the bid price. The marginal effect of the bid price on the probability of winning the bid is
decreasing. The cost curve, therefore, has a concave shape. Source: Paulson et al. (2018), p. 491.
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Generating attention is the first step in the process leading to behavior change. The
approach is therefore best suited to assess the benefit–cost ratio in the early stages of
program implementation. Furthermore, the approach is useful to evaluate small-scale
bystander programs. Small-scale programs may lack the resources necessary to
follow the more comprehensive framework. Finally, the direct value of public
attention is likely to be well below the costs of crime prevented. If the presented
approaches yield different results, we suggest interpreting the value of attention as the
lower bound of program benefits.
7. Conclusion
Bystander behavior contributes to preventing violent crime and the associated social
damages. It can be a useful complement to traditional police work if done properly.
Police campaigns in various countries therefore promote engaging in bystander
behavior. Before people decide to intervene in a violent situation, however, they
have to overcome a number of mental obstacles. The bystander program tackles the
mental obstacles in order to make people intervene despite personal risk. It also
teaches the skills necessary for safe and effective intervention. The online bystander
program addresses the challenges of traditional programs by reducing staff costs and
facilitating attendance.
In this paper, we have shown how social media allow targeting the right people
and collecting information for benefit–cost analysis. On that basis, we have devel-
oped a coherent framework for conducting a benefit–cost analysis of social media
facilitated bystander programs. As with any research approach, there are some
limitations. First, the breadth and depth of data collected is constrained by privacy
regulation and user consent. Each study that applies our framework has to reconcile
data requirements and privacy rights in the studied country. Second, if the framework
is implemented in practice, the external validity of results will be limited by political,
legal, and cultural differences between countries. Researchers should bear this
in mind.
Despite the limitations, social media data, analytics tools, and machine learning
technology have a large potential for the advancement of benefit–cost analysis. We
believe that our framework has laid the groundwork for further development. The
importance of social media for the dissemination and communication of policy
measures is constantly increasing. New evaluation methods are required to facilitate
evidence-based policymaking. Our intention is tomake such amethod accessible to a
broad readership.
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